High-quality accounting information is the basis of a healthy modern capital market, normative acts of the corporate accounting is a prerequisite for quality assurance. As the self-motivation of agent as well as the alternative of accounting procedures and methods, agent may act through the manipulation of accounting to meet their own needs. Therefore, how to pay through the rational incentives of managers to effectively alleviate the accounting behavior variation caused by the changes in the management of motivation, to improve the quality of accounting information, has become an important aspect of China's capital market supervision and optimization of accounting practices.
In this paper, we start with the essence of the meaning of accounting information and principal-agent relationship, Stand on corporate performance evaluation system and performance evaluation of point of view, analysis of the shortcomings of traditional incentives and raise EVA and MVA in a combination of incentives as a new standard, finally, we have any other recommendations for eliminating managers to control the distortion of accounting information.
Key words: Accounting information, Management incentive compensation,
Economic Value Added, Market Value Added
