China’s market economy has achieved undeniable achievements in the past few decades, and various types of enterprises have also grown up in continuous exploration and innovation. However, because executives pursue personal interests to maximize personal interests, they are in the collective interest. On the other hand, the speculative behavior has not been changed, resulting in the market order not being in a benign development stage. Negative problems are constantly appearing, hindering the healthy development of the market order. The outstanding performance is that some companies choose equity incentives for welfare motives and focus on the profit of equity sales. And the cost of acquiring equity is higher than the company's long-term value itself, triggering opportunistic behavioral tendencies. In this article, we will use the 425 equity incentive plans disclosed by domestic listed companies to the external market in 2018 as sample objects, and use the Wind Info Financial Terminal and the Ruisi Financial Database to collect and organize the following raw data: sample company plan The closing price on the announcement day, the closing price of the 180 trading days before the announcement, and the exercise price of the equity incentive plan, finally through the statistical analysis method to empirically test the existence of opportunistic opportunistic behavior in equity incentives.
Keywords: Stock options; Manipulation of Option Exercise Data
